

# ***Headquarters U.S. Air Force***

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***Integrity - Service - Excellence***

## **AIR FORCE RESERVE OIF “LESSONS LEARNED”**

**25 August 2003**



**Brigadier General  
William Rajczak**

**Deputy to the Chief  
of Air Force Reserve**



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# ***OVERVIEW***




- **AFR percentage of Total Force**
- **AFR contribution to OIF**
- **Historical context for OIF**
- **Lessons Learned / Problems Identified**
- **Summary**



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# Air Force End Strength



74,700 AFRC  
108,400 ANG  
358,800 AD



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# ***AFRC Mobilization***



**GWOT Peak Mobilization was during OIF      15,332**  
**(16 Apr 03)**

**Desert Shield/Storm Peak Mobilization      23,013**

**Total Number of AF Reservists**  
**Mobilized for GWOT      23,784**



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# Air Force Reserve Contribution



## ~~OIF Strategic Airlift~~



- **C-17**
  - 45% of AF crews
  - Combat Airdrop
  - Operating into Iraq Airfields

- **C-5**
  - 50% of AF crews

- **C-141C**
  - 40 AC (90% of C-141s)
  - Aeromedical Evac Msn
  - Repatriate POWs



AFRC has 51% of Total Force  
Airlift Crews



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# Air Force Reserve Contribution OIF Tankers



- **KC-10**
  - 25% of AF crews
- **KC-135**
  - 25% of AF crews
- Airbridge
- Theater Refueling

AFRC has 23% of Total Force  
Tanker Crews





# Air Force Reserve Contribution



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## ~~OIF Bombers and AWACS~~



- **B-52**

- 33% of crews
- LITENING II pod—  
First use on B-52
- Strategic Attack &  
CAS

AFRC has 8% of Total Force  
B-52 Crews



- **E-3 AWACS**

- 20% of crews
- Airborne Warning  
& Control

AFRC has 11% of Total Force  
AWACS Crews



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# Air Force Reserve Contribution ~~OIF~~ Combat Rescue



- **HH-60**
  - 33% of AF crews
  - Combat Rescue
- **HC-130**
  - 33% of AF crews
  - Combat Rescue

AFRC has 30% of Total Force  
Combat Rescue Crews





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# Air Force Reserve Contribution



## ~~OIF~~ Special Operations



- **MC-130 E/P**

- 62% of AF crews
- Special Ops

AFRC has 56% of Total Force  
Special Operations Crews



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# Air Force Reserve Contribution

## ~~Off Combat Support~~



- **Security Forces**

- 2165 Mobilized (1 Mar 02)

- **Civil Engineers**

- 549 Mobilized (16 Apr 02)

- **Aerial Porters**

- 921 Mobilized (16 Apr 02)

- **Intelligence**

Highly Commendable for Particular  
AFSC

- 497 Mobilized (16 Apr 02)

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# Air Force Reserve Contribution



## ~~OTF Enabler~~—Space Operations



- **7 Reserve Squadrons**

- 7<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq (DSP Satellites)  
Missile Warning

- 6<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq (DMSP Satellites)  
Meteorology

- 9<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq—Aerospace Ops  
Center

- 8<sup>th</sup> Space Warning Sq (SBIRS Satellites)  
Missile Warning

- 14<sup>th</sup> Test Squadron--Space Aggressor  
and Test

- 19<sup>th</sup> Space Ops Sq (GPS Satellites)  
Navigation

- 310<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Sq—Space  
Security

- **AFRC Personnel**

- 372 unit personnel

- 557 individual mobilization augmentees

(IMAs)

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# ***OVERVIEW***

## ***Historical Context***



- **Pre-9/11**
  - **Predictability**
  - **100% Volunteerism**
- **Post-9/11**
  - **Existing AEF requirements PLUS...**
  - **Surge requirements which drove near-immediate mobilization**
  - **Unplanned Homeland Security requirements at AFRC bases**
  - **Heavy CONUS CAP requirements**

**Continued...**





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# ***OVERVIEW***

## ***Historical Context***

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- **Rolling into OIF**
  - **Transitioning MPA volunteers to mobilized (PM) status (CENTCOM dictated)**
  - **Mob authority limitation—unknown duration of OIF**
- **Post-Iraqi Regime Change—current**
  - **Undefined requirements**
  - **Redeployment issues**
  - **Demobilization requirements**





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# ***Lessons Learned / Problems Identified***



- **Force Structure / Readiness**
- **Lengthy Mobilization**
- **Change in Planning / Execution Paradigm**
- **System Support**
- **Redeployment Priorities**
- **Optimizing Volunteerism**
- **Member and Community**



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# ***Force Structure / Readiness***



- **Pre-9/11 funded Total Force structure and readiness**
  - **Good News**
    - Air Force Reserve funded at C-1 readiness level
    - Air Force Reserve trained and funded to respond in 72 hours
    - AEF construct gave sourcing functionality and readiness statistics down to the UTC level
  - **Bad News**
    - Force structure based on pre-9/11 assessment of Homeland Security requirements
      - Security Forces needed for AFRC base security dual tasked
      - Sustained Combat Air Patrol requirement drain on fighter, tanker, and AWACS resources
    - AEF construct not easily adapted to sourcing rapidly changing requirements
      - Tough to manage volunteers and mobilized Reservists at same time
      - Different “communities” manage different AEF mission areas
- **Lesson Learned**
  - AF Corporate Structure needs to continue to reassess emerging requirements to insure proper force structure and funding
  - AEF construct evaluation is underway



# ***Lengthy Mobilization***



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- **PM for GWOT is the longest sustained, large-scale mobilization in the history of the Air Force**
    - **Only 5% of AF Reserve members have been mobilized for two years, however...**
      - **Critical career fields exist**
      - **ARC members are maxing out their 24-month clock**
        - Issues with CoCOMs and gaining MAJCOMs tracking release dates so that members are redeployed and released in time to accomplish demobilization actions (e.g., leave, reconstitution and downtime, medical processing)
        - Planning for future requirements complicated for heavily used specialties
  - **Lessons Learned**
    - **AFR resource not unlimited under single PM authority--affects operational planning and sustainability**
    - **Innovative approaches such as using Army Reserve Component support for AFRC base security can be pursued**
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
# ***Change in Planning / Execution Paradigm***



- **Previous deliberate/crisis planning paradigms not easily adapted to DEPORD-centric process**
  - **Coordination/processes required change frequently**
  - **Senior decision makers changed roles from direct involvement in deliberate and crisis planning to direct involvement in execution**
- **Problem Identified—Mobilization staff processes are not timely**



# Partial Mobilization Process in the Beginning








# Staff-Level Mobilization Processing Steps Added *Later*

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# ***System Support***



- **Air Force automated planning systems (e.g., ASPEN) not integrated with DCAVES; AFRC automated tracking systems not integrated with ASPEN**
  - **Duplication of effort**
  - **Increase likelihood of error**
  - **Increased processing time, delaying mobilization and deployment**
  - **Tracking personnel is problematic;**
    - **AF Reserve tracks until mobilization (and after, but not at a geographic-level of detail)**
    - **Active duty tracks after mobilization, but are not always able to know when members are moved to another location after their initial deployment location**
- **Problem Identified—Much work necessary to make systems streamline processes and track members; however significant progress already made with DCAVES—the only service system currently integrated with JOPES**



# ***Redeployment Priorities***



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
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- **Redeployment priorities--Criteria not clearly articulated, appeared ad hoc; Should be based on long-term effects and consequences**
  - **First-in; first-out?**
  - **Mobilized ARC out first?**
  - **Mission-dependent, based on long-term sustainability?**
- **Lesson Learned—Criteria for redeployment should be established and clearly articulated**



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# ARC Mobilized vs. Volunteers



**MOBREP data first collected 18 Sep 01; first personnel mobilized 21 Sep 01.**



# ***Optimizing Volunteerism***



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- **Volunteerism provides optimal use of ARC forces, maximizes the resource--obstacles to volunteerism should be minimized**
- **Lesson Learned—Provide parity of benefits between PM-ed members and MPA volunteers (e.g., TRICARE for families, BAH)**
- **Problem Identified—While members are allowed to volunteer for 365 day-MPA tours supporting GWOT, multiple waivers required**
- **Problem Identified--Need to provide motivation for Combatant Commanders to accept volunteers**
  - **CoComs prefer members who are committed to stay for longer periods**
  - **Perceptions that volunteers will just “pick up and leave” (they have even turned down 120-day volunteers in favor of PM-ed ARC members)**
- **Lessons Learned--Employer perceptions differ between PM and MPA volunteer**





# ***Member and Community***



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- **Member lesson learned—Essentially EVERYONE is deployable**
  - Family plan
  - Financial plan
- **Community lesson learned—Need plan for replacement of SF, medical, EOD personnel in case of reserve mobilization**



# Summary



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- **OIF Mission Accomplished**
  - **AF Total Force Concept worked—could not have been done without the ARC (volunteers + mobilized members)**
    - Made possible by AF investment in force structure and readiness
    - Pre-9/11 ARC participation in AEF provided ideal preparation
  - **Herculean team efforts overcame:**
    - Only partially integrated planning and execution systems
    - Frequent mobilization process changes
  - **Overall, AFRC forces were not fully exercised; however, small group of career fields were overtaxed (mobilized > 1 yr)**
- **Many lessons learned from ONE/OEF were applied to OIF; issues requiring development of in-depth solutions are being identified**



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# ***Questions ?***



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